

APPENDICES

-with usury capital and with the exploitation of the peasant
 ni2.«cs .r. gen-
 eral, that it takes its stand not only against the agrarian
 re\ol:it:o:: c'it ilso
 against every decisive agrarian reform. It is afraid, and not
 withe-;:* t:-:rA~
 tion, that even the more open formulation of the agrarian
 question will
 stimulate and accelerate the growth of the process of
 revolutionary ferment-
 ation in the peasant masses. Thus, the reformist
 bourgeoisie hardly dare :o
 decide to approach practically this basic urgent question.

Instead, it attempts by means of empty nationalist
 phrases and ^V-res
 to keep the petty bourgeois masses under its influence and
 to compel im-
 perialism to grant certain concessions. But the
 imperialists draw tle r;:ni
 ever tighter, for the national bourgeoisie is incapable of
 offering an-, s-erlrjs
 resistance. Accordingly, the national bourgeoisie in every
 conflict **i:h im-
 perialism attempt, on the one hand, to make a great show of
 their nations!:*:
 "firmness" of principle, and, on the other hand, they sow
 illu\$:::c:a as to
 the possibility of a peaceful compromise with imperialism.
 Thrcu~h '^th
 the one and the other, the masses inevitably become
 disillusioned and. in
 this way they gradually outlive their reformist illusions.

19. An incorrect estimation of the basic national-reformist
 tendenq- of ihi
 national bourgeoisie in these colonial countries gives
 rise :o the possibility
 of serious errors in the strategy and tactics of the
 Communist Parties con-
 cerned. In particular, two kinds of mistakes are possible:

1) A non-understanding of the difference between the
 national reformist
 and national-revolutionary tendency can lead to a
 "khvostist" polzev in re-
 lation to the bourgeoisie, to an insufficiently accurate
 political and organ-
 isational delimitation of the proletariat from the
 bourgeoisie, and to the
 blurring of the chief revolutionary slogans (especially the
 slogans of the
 agrarian revolution), etc. This was the fundamental mistake
 into which, she
 Communist Party of China fell in 1925-27.

2) An under-estimation of the special significance which
 the bourgeois
 national-reformist, as distinct from the feudal-imperialist
 camp, possesses]
 owing to its mass influence on the ranks of the petty
 bourgeoisie, peasantry
 and even a portion of the working class, may lead, at least in
 the first stages
 of the movement, to a sectarian policy and to the isolation

of the Communists from the toiling masses.

In both these cases, insufficient attention is given to the realisation, of precisely those tasks which the Second Congress of the Communist International had already characterised as the basic tasks of the Communist Parties in the colonial countries, i. e. the tasks of struggle against the bourgeois-democratic movement inside the nation itself. Without this struggle, without the liberation of the toiling masses from the influence of the bourgeoisie and of national-reformism, the basic strategical aim of the Communist movement in the bourgeois-democratic revolution—the hegemony of the proletariat—cannot be achieved. Without the hegemony of the proletariat, an organic part of which is the leading role of the Communist Party, the

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